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What individual and contextual factorsexplain what happens to offenders who
have been sentenced to death? An execution
clearly is the most severe legal punishment,
but no systematic research on the combined
political and individual factors that determine
which death row inmates will be executed
apparently exists. A few studies describe what
happens to these offenders after sentencing
(Aarons 1998; Liebman, Fagan, and West
2000), yet there are almost no systematic
investigations on the most important deter-
minants of executions. Studies by Spurr (2002)
and Blume and Eisenberg (1999) are partial
exceptions, but these studies focus only on
offender characteristics and ignore environ-
mental conditions. Although studies repeatedly
show that victim race is the most important
determinant of death sentences, we do not
know if this factor influences the fate of
offenders on death row because no investiga-
tions have determined whether this account
explains executions.
The factors that influence execution prob-
abilities are of interest partly because there are
such substantial disparities in this outcome.
Largely as a result of the appeals process that
occurs after a death sentence, less than 10
percent of all offenders on death row ulti-
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mately are executed (Liebman et al. 2000).1
There is great variation in the duration of this
process as well, apparently because death penal-
ty states differ sharply in their willingness to
execute. In many reluctant jurisdictions capital
offenders can spend well over two decades on
death row, but other states execute in far less
time. To assess the determinants of these legal
decisions about who will live and who will die,
we test theoretically based explanations using
an event history approach to discover the fac-
tors that influence post-death sentence execution
likelihoods.
Trial court studies on the offender attributes
that lead to death sentences show that offend-
ers who kill whites are far more likely to receive
this sentence (Baldus and Woodworth 2003;
Dodge et al. 1990; Paternoster 1991). Yet
whether victim race continues to explain the
fate of condemned prisoners after they have
been sentenced remains a complete mystery.
There are good reasons to think that this factor
will continue to matter. Yet it is equally plausi-
ble that the appellate court decisions that large-
ly determine death row outcomes are unaffected
by this consideration that, of course, should not
be relevant. In any event, both theoretical con-
siderations and concerns about equity make
this relationship between victim race and exe-
cution probabilities a critical issue.
This article will provide important evidence
about whether the death penalty is adminis-
tered impartially. But our primary goal is to
refine theories of punishment by using a com-
prehensive approach to gauge the explanatory
power of both individual and contextual effects.
It is unlikely that judges and the political offi-
cials who decide which death row inmates will
be executed are unaffected by their political
environment, especially because this punish-
ment is such an intensely moral issue. In part
because some death row offenders face far lower
execution probabilities than those in less lenient
jurisdictions (Liebman et al. 2000), we gauge the
effects of the sociopolitical environment as well
as offender and victim attributes.
There are strong reasons for such a com-
bined approach. Two isolated traditions have
coexisted in the literature. Many studies use
individual data to explain trial court sentencing,
but others rely on aggregate data to study addi-
tional criminal justice outcomes. State or nation-
al attributes have been used to explain shifts in
incarceration rates (Jacobs and Carmichael
2001; Jacobs and Helms 1996; Stucky, Heimer,
and Lang 2005; Sutton 2000; Western 2006).
The urban conditions that explain police depart-
ment size (Jacobs 1979; Kent and Jacobs 2005),
arrest rates (Brown and Warner 1992), or the use
of deadly force by the police (Jacobs and
O’Brien 1998) have been researched as well. Yet
except for a few studies that assess how com-
munity and individual determinants combine
to affect the sentencing of non-capital offend-
ers (Helms and Jacobs 2002; Myers and Talarico
1987), there is little research on the combined
effects of individual and contextual determi-
nants. But the many results based on aggregate
data showing that context is a strong determi-
nant of multiple criminal justice outcomes make
it difficult to believe that such environmental
factors do not influence post-sentencing deci-
sions about executions.
We therefore use an integrated theoretical
approach that emphasizes political explanations
and the racial accounts in earlier conflict stud-
ies (Turk 1969). An execution is an intrinsical-
ly political act. Foucault (1977) views executions
as rituals designed to enhance political power by
reminding potential miscreants of the state’s
vast coercive resources. But there are more con-
crete reasons for studying political effects. Most
researchers who first tested conflict explanations
hypothesized that larger and therefore more
threatening minority populations would increase
support for repressive law and order measures.
Citizens threatened by expansions in a minori-
ty presence often react by demanding harsh
criminal justice policies. Because criminal jus-
tice agencies are operated by the state, this pres-
sure has to be directed at political officials. By
1 Local trial courts sentence, but appeals are han-
dled by higher state and federal courts. The first two
capital appeals typically are decided by state appel-
late courts. Condemned offenders then can petition
the federal courts. About 41 percent of all death sen-
tences are reversed on first state appeal and about 9.5
percent are reversed in the second. About 40 percent
of those who then seek federal relief are successful
(Liebman et al. 2000). Most of the remainder are exe-
cuted. But a few receive executive clemency, some
die before execution, and a few are removed from
death row for miscellaneous reasons. Almost all of
the condemned who obtain appellate relief are resen-
tenced to long prison terms.
assessing the political factors that result from
added demands for this severe punishment, we
seek to broaden the conflict approach to pun-
ishment.
This article therefore offers the promise of
filling many important gaps in the sparse liter-
ature on post-death sentence execution proba-
bilities by using a survival analysis that adjusts
for censoring and assesses both offender and
political characteristics. The multiple advan-
tages that result from the inclusion of both indi-
vidual and contextual factors suggest that this
analysis will provide an accurate picture of the
post-sentencing death penalty process. Results
based on models that assess many explanations
are most accurate (Johnston 1984, see note 11),
but such an inclusive approach means that the
theoretical section cannot focus on only a few
explanations.
THEORY
Inasmuch as scholars claim that race continues
to have powerful effects on U.S. politics
(Goldfield 1997; Jacobs and Tope 2007; Key
1949), and because the administration of the
death penalty is such an intense political issue,
racial politics provide the primary conceptual
basis for this analysis. Most research on the
death sentence focuses on the race of individ-
ual offenders and their victims. We assess such
micro minority accounts by gauging the
explanatory power of various offender-victim
minority-majority combinations, but we fill
contextual gaps in the literature by analyzing the
influence of minority threat in the political envi-
ronments in which these decisions are made.
Ideology also should matter as this penalty is
such an intensely moral issue and since we
study it in the most direct of all large democra-
cies. In contrast to other nations, U.S. politicians
routinely encourage citizens to vote on the basis
of their views about capital punishment. Another
closely related account suggests that the
parochial interests of politicians influence exe-
cutions. Tactical rhetoric that stresses the deprav-
ity of a minority underclass and the need for
harsh measures should affect support for this
penalty (Beckett 1997) and its probability.
We present the theoretical foundation for
four interrelated proposition sets. First, we dis-
cuss the conceptual basis for micro-level racial
hypotheses derived from the literature on sen-
tencing. Second, we present theoretically based
hypotheses about the contextual effects of
minority threat, political ideology, and parti-
san politics. At the end of this section, we pre-
sent justifications for additional explanations for
execution probabilities.
INDIVIDUAL EXPLANATIONS: EXTRA-LEGAL
MICRO RACIAL ACCOUNTS AND LEGAL
FACTORS
If penal measures are best explained by their
interrelationships with other social arrange-
ments rather than by their alleged legal pur-
poses (Garland 1990:91), it would be surprising
if the most important U.S. social division did not
influence the administration of the most severe
legal punishment. A conceptual grounding in
racial politics therefore should provide the best
theoretical foundation for a study that analyzes
the administration of the death penalty. In the-
oretical essays Wacquant (2000, 2001) uses
arguments about social impurity and taboo to
show how the Jim Crow racial caste system
persists in socially altered but less conspicuous
forms in the contemporary U.S. criminal justice
system. To discover if such racial considera-
tions still affect decisions about legal punish-
ments, the question that motivates almost all of
the many sentencing studies is whether the trial
courts treat minorities the same as nonminori-
ties (Chiricos and Crawford 1995; Walker,
Spohn, and DeLone 1996; Zatz 1987).
Findings about non-capital sentences, and
those from the less ample literature on the fac-
tors that account for death sentences, should
provide the best available empirical basis for
selecting the individual factors that explain
which condemned prisoners will be executed.
Despite their number, only a bare majority of the
non-capital sentencing studies show that the
trial courts give harsher sentences to minorities,
but almost as many careful investigations do not
find such biases (Chiricos and Crawford 1995;
Walker et al. 1996). Studies on the links between
offender race and death sentences are even less
likely to suggest that white offenders are treat-
ed with greater leniency than minorities (Baldus
and Woodworth 2003; Dodge et al. 1990;
Paternoster 1991). In light of the systematic
discrimination faced by African Americans,
however, we follow precedent and hypothesize
that: The likelihood of executions should be
greater for African Americans on death row. In
some jurisdictions Hispanics are the most threat-
ening minority that faces severe discrimina-
tion. It is equally plausible that: Hispanics on
death row should face higher execution proba-
bilities than whites.
Offenders convicted of killing whites are par-
ticularly likely to be sentenced to death (Baldus
and Woodworth 2003; Dodge et al. 1990;
Paternoster 1991), especially if the offender is
black (Baldus and Woodworth 2003). Wacquant
(2000) provides one theoretical foundation for
this persistent association when he claims that
harsh legal punishments continue to be used to
maintain the “symbolic distance needed to pre-
vent the odium of ‘amalgamation’with [minori-
ties] considered inferior, rootless, and vile” (p.
380). The ultimate symbolic assault on such a
caste system occurs when an underclass minor-
ity kills a white. In this research we discover if
this account that explains death sentences so
well also explains execution probabilities.
Two causal paths seem most plausible. In
contrast to the great majority of homicides,
media outlets focus on interracial murders, par-
ticularly if the victim is white (Bandes 2004,
Lipschultz and Hilt 2002). This increased cov-
erage is critical as victories in well-publicized
capital trials often help politically ambitious
prosecutors reach higher office. But such tri-
umphs must be protected. Prosecutors there-
fore have strong reasons to vigorously oppose
capital appeals that may jeopardize legal victo-
ries that are likely to further their political
careers.2 Even if other facilitative conditions
are absent, the media’s focus on those murders
in which a white was killed by a minority puts
added pressure on state appellate court justices
to rule against these death row offenders when
they appeal (Liebman, Fagan, and West 2002).
And disregarding these pressures can be cost-
ly. State judges who ignored intense public sup-
port for particular executions and granted
appellate relief to such petitioners have lost
their seats in retention elections, even though
only the incumbent appears on retention elec-
tion ballots (Brace and Hall 1997; Bright and
Keenan 1995). Hence: African American or
Hispanic offenders convicted of murdering a
white should be less likely than other offenders
to avoid the death chamber.
Most studies of the determinants of non-cap-
ital sentencing that assess the effects of gender
find that in comparison to females, trial courts
give less lenient sentences to males (Bickle and
Peterson 1991). This finding may be partially
based on a failure to control for the ways offend-
ers participated in their crimes. Women con-
victed of robbery, for instance, often do not
engage in the violence associated with this
felony. Inasmuch as their involvement is less
pernicious, such offenders receive lighter sen-
tences than their male associates. It nevertheless
is reasonable to expect that chivalrous inclina-
tions should reduce female execution probabil-
ities, so: Women on death row should be less
likely to be executed than males. Finally, find-
ings show that offenders with prior convictions
are sentenced more severely by trial courts. This
practice is reasonable as repeat offenders are
likely to pose a greater threat to the communi-
ty after their release or to guards and other
inmates while they are imprisoned. Hence:
Execution probabilities will be greater for those
condemned prisoners with previous convictions.
CONTEXTUAL EXPLANATIONS: RACIAL
THREAT, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, AND
PARTISANSHIP
The multiple decisions that ultimately produce
an execution do not occur in a social vacuum.
A few studies of sentencing decisions for non-
capital crimes productively treat the trial courts
as complex organizations. Yet analyses of con-
textual forces external to organizations have
sharply increased our understanding of organi-
zational behavior (Perrow 1986; Scott 1987).
The multiple findings based on aggregate data
that provide such robust explanations for crim-
inal justice outcomes and the strong organiza-
tion-environment relationships so often
uncovered in the organizational literature point
2 After a death sentence, local prosecutors can
have important effects on the subsequent appeals. For
example, their delays in filing for an execution date
slow appeals. In fact, any failure to act promptly
favors condemned offenders as delayed appeals are
not as likely to be vigorously contested. For this and
other reasons, the local prosecutor who won an ini-
tial death sentence verdict often plays an important
role in resisting subsequent appeals, although this role
may be informal. Hence, prosecutor commitment to
efforts to resist death row appeals should influence
execution probabilities.
in the same direction. Both research streams
suggest that legal decision makers who are
embedded in political environments do not
ignore such conditions when they decide if an
execution will occur.
RACIAL MIX. The fierce U.S. disputes about
race in the past probably make this fissure the
most resilient and influential division in con-
temporary U.S. politics (Goldfield 1997; Jacobs
and Tope 2007; Key 1949). A majority’s eth-
nocentric views and that group’s inclination to
view minorities as trespassers enhance such a
group’s presumption that they should retain
exclusive claims over important rights and priv-
ileges (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo and
Hutchings 1996). Hostility and entrenched
beliefs about a majority’s “rightful” position
are solidified by the political struggles that
occur when minority groups seek to alter these
arrangements (Blumer 1958). According to
threat theorists, when large minority popula-
tions endanger their dominance, whites often
react by supporting law and order measures that
at least indirectly target these minorities.
Findings are supportive. Racist views are
more widespread in cities with more black res-
idents (Fosset and Kiecolt 1989; Quillian 1996;
Taylor 1998). An enhanced minority presence
produces added votes for anti-minority candi-
dates (Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz
1994; Heer 1959) who are likely to endorse
harsh criminal punishments. With crime rates
held constant, Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico
(1982) and Quillian and Pager (2001) find that
fear of crime is greater in cities or neighbor-
hoods with more black residents. Larger minor-
ity populations lead to additional police officers
(Jacobs 1979; Kent and Jacobs 2005). Other
findings show that the death penalty is likely to
be legal in states with the highest percentages
of African American residents (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2002), while the number of death
sentences is greater in states with the largest
African American populations (Jacobs,
Carmichael, and Kent 2005).
These results suggest that severe punishments
will increase in areas after a growth in minori-
ty presence. Yet if minority proportions expand
and their political influence becomes sufficient,
the positive relationship between this threat and
punitiveness may reverse. All governors, almost
all local prosecutors, and most state appellate
justices are elected. Expansions in African
American or Hispanic proportions past a thresh-
old should give these minorities enough votes
to influence decisions about executions. Hence:
The relationship between the percentage of
blacks and execution probabilities should be
positive if minority presence is modest, but after
this percentage reaches a threshold, this asso-
ciation should become negative and executions
should diminish. For this sign reversal to occur,
a minority need not outnumber other groups.
Minority size need only reach the point where
their votes may help decide elections, and this
proportion can be modest if other voting blocs
are evenly matched. This logic and nonlinear
findings about death sentence frequency (Jacobs
et al. 2005) suggest that an inverted U-shaped
relationship between African American pres-
ence and executions will be present.
The relationship between Hispanic presence
and executions may take a different nonlinear
form. In many non-southwestern states, the pro-
portion of Hispanic residents is minute. The
median percentage of Hispanics was 2.4 percent
in the sampled states, yet the same statistic for
blacks was 6.8 percent or 2.9 times greater. As
the Hispanic population was so modest in so
many states, it is plausible that this population
must reach a threshold size before whites see
Hispanics as sufficiently threatening. Hence:
The nonlinear relationship between the per-
centage of Hispanic residents and execution
probabilities should become increasingly pos-
itive only after the comparative size of this eth-
nic minority reaches a level sufficient to threaten
majority Anglos.
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY. Claims that ideology
helps shape legal penalties are especially com-
pelling when U.S. sanctions are at issue, as this
nation is such an exceptionally direct democracy
(Savelsberg 1994; Whitman 2003). The result-
ing close voter control over criminal punish-
ments, which are decided by bureaucratic
experts in the less direct European democracies,
ought to make mass ideologies crucial when
such intensely moral decisions about who will
die must be made. Images of evil and the result-
ing beliefs about the most appropriate punish-
ments that stem from these assumptions about
human nature are a foundational component of
political ideologies. Conservatives often see
crime as resulting from freely made but amoral
choices (Lacey 1988). If such presumptions are
correct, increases in expected costs should be
effective. Many conservatives therefore stress
the irreversibility and the deterrent effects of
executions. Such views about the efficacy of
incapacitation and deterrence provide the basis
for empirically dubious conservative claims
that a few executions will protect many innocent
victims from criminal brutality.3
Liberals instead see criminal acts as imposed
by circumstances (Garland 2001; Thorne 1990).
These acts result from noxious environmental
conditions such as poverty or discrimination.
Liberals view policies that alleviate these inju-
rious conditions (Taylor, Walton, and Young
1973) and therapeutic efforts to resocialize
offenders (Garland 2001) as the best remedies.
In contrast to conservatives, liberal survey
respondents are far less likely to support the
death penalty (Lakoff 1996; Langworthy and
Whitehead 1986). Findings corroborate these
claims as they show that the most liberal states
are unlikely to legalize this punishment (Jacobs
and Carmichael 2002). It follows that:
Executions should not be as probable where
liberal views predominate, as prosecutors and
appellate justices should be less likely to
endorse this penalty in these jurisdictions.
POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP. Because they seek
outcomes that help the prosperous, political
parties closer to the right face election obstacles.
These parties, for example, usually choose tax
policies that benefit their affluent core sup-
porters at the expense of the less affluent (Allen
and Campbell 1994). Yet prosperous voters are
in the minority. Because such parties have a
smaller voter base than their rivals, conservatives
often use law and order claims to appeal to less
affluent voters who are more likely to be crime
victims and who often live where such risks
are greater. Officials in the Nixon and first
Bush campaigns for the presidency admit that
they emphasized this issue to attract anti-minor-
ity voters.4 By focusing on street crime and
other social problems readily blamed on under-
class minorities, Republicans won elections by
using this “wedge” issue to gain sufficient votes
from less prosperous citizens. Multiple findings
show that Republican (Jacobs and Carmichael
2001; Stucky et al. 2005; Western 2006) or con-
servative political strength (Sutton 2000) led
to severe criminal justice outcomes. Because
capital punishment has been an important issue
in many state political campaigns (Constanzo
1997) and because Jacobs and Carmichael
(2002) find that this punishment is likely to be
legal in states with the strongest Republican
parties, we expect that greater Republican polit-
ical strength in a state should increase execution
probabilities.
Republican campaigns for the presidency
have relied on and probably accentuated
(Beckett 1997) mass perceptions about the links
between purportedly venal underclass life styles
and lawlessness. Findings show that votes for the
f irst of these presidents who successfully
exploited public views about the linkages
between race and crime (Nixon in 1968) help
explain how quickly states relegalized capital
punishment after the 1976 court decisions that
3 Careful reviews of the multiple empirical stud-
ies on this issue conducted by legal scholars (Zimring
and Hawkins 1986), criminologists (Hood 1998;
Paternoster 1991), sociologists (Bailey and Peterson
1999), and economists (Donohue and Wolfers 2005;
Levitt 2002) conclude that the death penalty has no
discernable general deterrent effects beyond those
imposed by long prison terms. This list of skeptics
about the deterrent effects of executions includes a
scholar (Levitt 2002) who has published multiple
findings showing that imprisonment and other poli-
cies designed to control crime are effective deterrents.
4 A participant described Nixon’s 1968 campaign:
“We’ll go after the racists. That subliminal appeal to
the anti-black voter was always present in Nixon’s
statements and speeches” (Ehrlichman 1982:233).
Other vivid examples occurred in the 1988 Bush
campaign against Dukakis. Republicans ran an adver-
tisement declaring, “‘Dukakis not only opposed the
death penalty, he allowed first-degree murderers to
have weekend passes from prison.’.|.|. [as the] clear-
ly black [offender]—Willie Horton stared dully into
the camera.” They next released an advertisement fea-
turing a victim. “‘Mike Dukakis and Willie Horton
changed our lives forever .|.|. Horton broke into our
home. For twelve hours, I was beaten, slashed, and
terrorized. My wife Angie was brutally raped’”
(Carter 1996:76–77). This emphasis did not abate. In
a House debate in 1994 “29 Republican[s] .|.|. spoke
derisively about midnight basketball .|.|. character-
izing the program as ‘hugs for thugs’” (Hurwitz and
Peffley 2005:99–100).
forced changes in these statutes (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2002). Incarceration rates also were
higher after more voters supported a Republican
law and order presidential candidate (Weidner
and Frase 2003). Hence: Death row inmates
should be less likely to avoid the death cham-
ber in states in which more voters support
Republican presidential candidates because
prosecutors, appellate justices, and governors
will face stronger pressures to allow executions
in these jurisdictions.
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS
Murder is the most threatening crime. Execution
probabilities therefore should be greater in states
with higher murder rates. Following Durkheim’s
emphasis on the determinants of restitutive law,
states with a larger and more diverse population
and an enhanced division of labor should not be
as likely to use this most severe punishment.
This perspective also suggests that solidarity
should matter. Migration interferes with social
cohesion. Outsiders inspire hostility and fear, but
their absence strengthens bonds and intragroup
empathetic feelings (Hale 1996). Citizens in
states with few outsiders therefore should not be
as willing to support executions. This factor
accounts for the legality of the death penalty
(Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), so executions
should be less likely when most residents were
born in the states where they now live.
Research on imprisonment has focused on the
Marxist view that punishment is used to control
the supply of labor (Rusche and Kirchheimer
1939). Many researchers have assessed the link
between unemployment and incarceration, but the
results are mixed. A review (Chiricos and Delone
1992) shows that about 60 percent of the 147
associations between unemployment and impris-
onments are significant. Despite such mixed
results, we expect that high joblessness will
enhance execution probabilities because the pros-
perous may view the unemployed as a threat or
because high unemployment enhances resent-
ments against criminals and accentuates demands
for harsh sanctions. Yet the unemployment rate
may have to reach a threshold before it matters,
so we test a nonlinear relationship between this
variable and execution probabilities. Primarily as
a result of the multiple state and federal appeals,
expensive expert testimony, and the other costs
required for due process in decisions that may end
a life, executions are far more expensive than
alternatives such as life imprisonment. States
with a superior tax base should be more likely to
use this expensive punishment. Finally, to see if
the unique arrangements in the South influence
death row outcomes, we also control for this
region.
METHODS
ESTIMATION
Our aim is to discover how offender attributes
and the political and social characteristics of the
states affect post-sentencing execution likeli-
hoods. To test these hypotheses, we use an event
history approach. This procedure provides a
remedy for the censoring that occurs because
offenders face different execution risks. Some
offenders remained on death row after 2001, so
this right-censored group was in danger of being
executed after the end of the observation peri-
od. The other right-censoring occurs when
offenders were removed from death row large-
ly as a result of successful appeals. Event his-
tory analysis uses the information from cases
with incomplete duration who were not exe-
cuted to avoid the bias that would occur if these
censored cases were not included.5 We employ
discrete-time logit models to predict execution
probabilities. Our first model will assess the
influence of individual factors. This model takes
the form:
Pijt
log ( 1 – Pijt) = td +
M

m=1
mXmi (1)
where Pijt is the conditional probability of exe-
cution for death row offender i in state j at time
5 Because event history analysis takes advantage
of all available information, we include death row
offenders near the end of the analysis period although
such offenders are not as likely to be executed.
Offenders still on death row are right-censored regard-
less of how long they have been on death row, but our
estimation approach will not be biased by this or
other forms of censoring. Note that selection biases
should not be problematic because we only explain
what happens to offenders sentenced to death. We
make no claims about whether those who received a
less severe punishment than death would have dif-
ferent likelihoods of being executed if they had been
sentenced to death.
t given that the execution has not already
occurred to that individual prior to time t. t is
years from death sentence. The log odds of exe-
cution at time t is a function of a set of time-con-
stant covariates as well as a set of temporal
dummies (td) to account for time dependence
(td).6 The individual level covariates entered in
this model include offender race, ethnicity, gen-
der, prior convictions, and victim race. The
models also include interactions between
offender and victim race. We assess the explana-
tory power of state-level contextual effects by
using variables such as the percentage of a
state’s vote for Republican candidates in time-
varying form. The subsequent and more exhaus-
tive models therefore take the following form:
Pijt
log ( 1 – Pijt) =
td +
M

m=1
mXmi +
N

n=1
nXnj(t–1) (2)
where the conditional probability of execution
at time t is a function of a set of individual con-
demned prisoner factors as well as state char-
acteristics at time t-1. Death row offenders may
be treated similarly within a state with the same
death penalty provisions and the same officials
deciding appeals. To adjust for this possible
departure from statistical independence, we
report z-values corrected for within-state cor-
related errors with a cluster procedure (Rogers
1993).
SAMPLE
Most offender information was taken from
(ICPSR study 3958) “Capital Punishment in
the United States” (CPUS) from 1973 to 2002
(this source is limited to those years). This
source gives state, date of removal from death
row, and reasons for removal, but it does not
contain data on victim race. For all offenders
who were executed, race of the victim, offend-
er race, state, and execution date are available
from the Death Penalty Information Center.7
To obtain victim race we merged this data into
the CPUS file by matching execution date and
race of executed offenders.8
To obtain race of victim for former death
row offenders removed from death row before
execution or for offenders still on death row, we
had to use another source. The Supplemental
Homicide Reports (SHR) contain information
on offense date, victim race, offender race, and
age. We obtain victim race by matching SHR
data with offender data from state correction
department records by f irst using date of
offense, and then offender race and age, but
only 16 states could or would provide offense
date. We merge the offender data with the CPUS
data using date of sentence, offender race, and
age. This matching process yields victim race
for 1,012 current and former death row offend-
ers who were not executed in 16 states. To cap-
ture the effects of this explanatory variable, the
analysis must be restricted to 16 states, but these
states are selected by a presumably random
process based on whether a state provides date
of offense—an administrative decision inde-
6 Because execution risk is small in the first 12
years after a death sentence, we combine these years
into one period and use it as the reference group. We
then create three additional dummy variables: the
first is coded 1 for periods since death sentence
between 13 and 20 years, the second between 21 and
23 years, and the third from year 24 on death row and
later. This categorization captures the distribution of
execution likelihoods as this distribution has a long
flat tail to the left resulting from low initial risks and
an inverted-U shaped distribuion thereafter. To dis-
cover if this categorization is unrepresentative, we cre-
ated alternative codes for death row years beyond 12.
The significance test results and the theoretical impli-
cations persist when we reestimate the models with
these alternatives.
7 This Web site is www.deathpenaltyinfo.org.
Although the Supreme Court’s 1972 Furman decision
made executions unconstitutional, Furman left open
the possibility of a constitutional death penalty. Many
death penalty states therefore maintained their death
row populations and altered their statutes. In 1976 in
Gregg and other cases the Court declared some mod-
ified death penalty statutes constitutional (Paternoster
1991; Zimring and Hawkins 1986). The data for a
plausible study of death row outcomes before 1973
apparently do not exist.
8 Since 1973, 768 of the 820 offenders executed
were matched. Data inconsistencies in these two
sources explain the modest unmatched remainder.
States analyzed are: Arizona, California, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
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pendent of the state or offender characteristics
at issue.9
We therefore have information on victim race
for all executed offenders and for about 28 per-
cent of current or former death row offenders
in these 16 states who were not executed.
Although the execution rate from our sample is
much higher than the equivalent rate in the
CPUS data, such disparate rates should not bias
our multivariate results. Our goal is to discov-
er which explanatory variables affect execution
rates. We are interested in how relative execu-
tion risks shift based on, for example, the mur-
der of a white instead of a nonwhite. Because
we include all executed offenders in these states,
but only a fraction of death row offenders who
were not executed, our sample design is equiv-
alent to a response-based sample design. Such
a design uses all events that occur in a specified
time period, but samples individuals who are at
risk of experiencing the event but did not
(Prentice and Pyke 1979). To analyze a
response-based sample, Xie and Manski (1989)
propose a weighted maximum likelihood esti-
mator for a logit analysis. Xie and Manski
demonstrate that estimates from a response-
based sample behave asymptotically with no
bias and with little loss in efficiency. We apply
this weighted maximum likelihood estimator
in our logit model. Following Xie and Manski
(1989), we define a weight variable that equals
qp
wt =
fp
(3)
where if p = 1, qp is the proportion executed
from the CPUS sample and fp is the propor-
tion executed from our sample; if p = 0, qp is
the proportion not executed in the CPUS sam-
ple and fp is the proportion not executed in our
sample.10
The selection procedures we use are like-
ly to produce a random sample because our
selection method depends on between data
source matches. This assumption that our esti-
mates of explanatory effects will be unbiased
is corroborated by the results in Table 1 show-
ing between sample contrasts. Most between
sample offender attributes are extremely sim-
ilar. Although Hispanics are underrepresent-
ed and whites are overrepresented in our
sample, this bias is eliminated by including
offender race and ethnicity in all analyses.
Table 1 shows a total of 4,145 (3,597 + 548)
death row offenders between 1973 and 2002
in 16 states from the CPUS data, and 13.2 per-
cent were executed (548/4,145). In compari-
son to their proportion in the population,
disproportionately more African Americans
and Hispanics were on death row. Of those
executed, slightly more were white. An over-
whelming majority of death row offenders
were male (98 percent); and even higher pro-
portions of males were executed (99.3 per-
cent). Absent controls, death row offenders
with prior conviction records faced a higher
chance of execution than those with no prior
conviction. Among current or former death
row offenders, two-thirds killed a white, but
among the executed offenders, four-f ifths
killed a white. The multivariate analyses will
show if victim race interacts with race of
offender to alter execution likelihoods with
other relevant factors held constant.
Finally, because the proportion of Asian
and Native American death row offenders is
too modest to produce statistically signifi-
cant results, these offenders are excluded
9 Included states exhibit considerable variation in
execution probabilities. Most but not all of the miss-
ing death penalty states are small with few at risk of
execution. Two exceptions are North Carolina and
Pennsylvania, but the corrections departments in
these and the other missing states with death row pop-
ulations would or could not provide offense dates, so
the effects of victim race are not analyzed in these
states. The funds from a generous grant were exhaust-
ed by the matching process we had to use to obtain
data on victim race. We therefore cannot employ
costly supplemental data sources such as newspaper
accounts, local prosecutor records (if any exist), or
make detailed appraisal of this process in particular
death penalty states.
10 Weighted maximum likelihood estimates of a
logit model make response-based samples behave
asymptotically as if they were random (Manski and
Lerman 1977). This method does not require that
researchers select the best estimator. Even if the best
estimator is probit rather than logit, Xie and Manski
(1989) use Monte Carlo simulations to show that
the weighted maximum likelihood logit estimator
gives good results as long as response-based samples
are larger than 1,000 as ours is.
from our analyses. We also exclude offenders
who died on death row for reasons other than
an execution, but these decisions have no dis-
cernable effects on the results.11 We therefore
analyze outcomes experienced by 1,560 post-
Furman death row offenders in 16 states from
1973 to 2002. The corrections we use—that
are grounded in the econometric literature on
how such samples can be analyzed to pro-
vide accurate findings—should give unbi-
ased and consistent  est imates of  the
determinants of executions. This is so even
though our sample includes all offenders who
were executed, but only about 28 percent of
those who were not executed in these 16
states.
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
One general specification of the discrete time
logit model that predicts the log of execution
odds for death row offender i in state j at time
t is:
Log EXECUTION ODDSij(t) =
(td DURATION DUMMIES) + 
b1BLACKij + b2HISPANICij +
b3VWHITEij + b4(BLACK ij 
VWHITEij) + b5(HISPANICij 
VWHITEij) + b6MALEij +
b7PRIORij + b8%BLKj(t–1) +
b9%BLK2j(t–1) + (4)
b10%HISP3j(t–1) + b11POPj(t–1) +
b12MURDRTj(t–1) + b13BORNINSTj(t–1) +
b14IDEOLOGYj(t–1) + b15%PPRSVOTEj(t–1) +
b16 RLMEDINCj(t–1) + b17 %UNEMPj(t–1) +
b18 %UNEMP2j(t–1) + b19YEAR92PLUSj +
b20STHj
where all explanatory variables are defined
below.12
Table 1. Percentage Distributions of Offender Characteristics in 16 States by Samplea
Sample in Which Race
Total CPUS Sample of Victim is Available
Not Executed Executed Not Executed Executed
3,597 548 1,012 548
Race (Percent)
—White 48.1 55.5 53.6 55.5
—Black 39.8 34.9 40.1 34.9
—Hispanic 12.1 09.7 06.2 09.7
Sex
—Percent Maleb 98.3 99.3 98.0 99.3
Marital Status at Offense
—Percent Marriedb 24.0 30.8 21.2 30.8
College Education at Offense
—Percent Yesb 07.6 07.7 10.0 07.7
Prior Convictions
—Percent Yesb 59.4 68.2 59.5 68.2
Race of the Victim (Percent)
—White 66.5 80.3
—Nonwhite 33.5 19.7
a Marital status and college education at offense cannot be used in the logit regressions because too many missing
values are present; we provide their distributions to better compare samples that do not include and include race
of victim.
b These percentages plus the omitted category for each variable sum to 100 percent.
11 We eliminated 179 offenders from the sample
because they died on death row before execution; 118
Native Americans and 34 Asians or Pacific Islanders
also were eliminated leaving a total of 1,560 offend-
ers. In analyses (not shown) we find that these exclu-
sions do not affect the reported results. Deficiencies
in the data made efforts to code race of victim in the
few instances when there were multiple victims too
speculative, so most of these cases were omitted.
12 We use exhaustive models. According to
Johnston (1984), “It is more serious to omit relevant
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS. We create two dummy
variables for minority offenders: the first equals
1 if an offender is African American (BLACK),
the second equals 1 if an offender is Hispanic
(HISPANIC), and both dummies are set equal
to 0 if the condition in question is not true.
Another dummy variable is coded 1 only if the
victim is white (VWHITE). We next create two
interaction terms: the f irst (BLACK 
VWHITE) is equal to the dummy variable coded
1 for an African American offender times the
dummy variable coded 1 for a white victim; the
second (HISPANIC VWHITE) is equal to the
dummy variable coded 1 for an Hispanic offend-
er times the dummy variable coded 1 for a white
victim. Additional individual effects are held
constant with a dummy variable coded 1 if a
death row inmate is male (MALE) and anoth-
er coded 1 if a death row inmate has prior con-
victions (PRIOR).13
CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS. We measure racial
threat effects with the percentage of African
Americans (%BLK) and the percentage of
Hispanic residents (%HISP) in each state, but
in contrast to all other contextual variables, the
percentage of Hispanics in the states is unavail-
able in the non-census years before 1990. We
therefore use decennial census figures in the five
years after a census and figures from the next
census in the next five years before 1990; after
1990 this variable is time varying by year (the
results persist if we use yearly linear interpola-
tions to estimate these missing values).14 To
capture nonlinear quadratic relationships, both
minority threat variables are entered in untrans-
formed and squared form. All state-level vari-
ables, save the percentage of Republican votes
for president and Hispanics (which time vary by
four or five years), are time-varying by year.
Following convention in studies of public pol-
icy, the yearly time-varying explanatory vari-
ables are lagged by a year because their effects
should not be instantaneous.
Theory, however, suggests that Hispanic pres-
ence should have a nonlinear relationship with
execution probabilities that becomes increas-
ingly stronger as this indicator reaches extreme
values, yet there is no reason to think this asso-
ciation should shift direction. Higher percent-
ages of Hispanics, for example, may well
produce increasingly greater execution proba-
bilities, but it is difficult to see how growth
from a low to a somewhat higher percentage of
Hispanics could lead to reductions in execu-
tion probabilities. When a priori considerations
suggest that such nonlinear relationships that
should not change direction are present, power
transformations are most appropriate (Cohen et
al. 2003:225–54). Threat theory thus suggests
that a single exponential transformation will be
best. To avoid iterative searches for the best
exponent and overfitting, we cube the percent-
age of Hispanics. This power transformation is
somewhat unconventional in sociology (but not
in psychology). To provide comparisons and
reassure the reader, we present otherwise iden-
tical models with and without this transforma-
tion.
We assess the influence of the division of
labor with population (POP). Following Jacobs
and Carmichael (2002), who find that this meas-
variables than to include irrelevant variables since in
the former case the coefficients will be biased, the dis-
turbance variance overestimated, and conventional
inference procedures rendered invalid, while in the
latter case the coefficients will be unbiased, the dis-
turbance variance properly estimated, and the infer-
ence procedures properly estimated. This constitutes
a fairly strong case for including rather than exclud-
ing relevant variables in equations. There is, howev-
er, a qualification. Adding extra variables, be they
relevant or irrelevant, will lower the precision of esti-
mation of the relevant coefficients” (p. 262). Hence
our comprehensive models should produce more
accurate point estimates but the significance tests will
be relatively conservative.
13 Although we cannot introduce a control for
offense severity because information is not avail-
able, a legal requirement probably makes such a con-
trol unnecessary. In the Gregg case that relegalized
capital punishment, the Court held that jurors can sen-
tence offenders to death only if they deem the crime
to be sufficiently horrific. Aggravating criteria stip-
ulated by legislatures that jurors must consider when
making this judgment include the killing of multiple
victims, murdering a child, or homicides that involve
deliberate torture (Paternoster 1991). Such prereq-
uisites probably create a more precise control for
offense severity than the alternatives used in studies
that assess sentencing for non-capital crimes.
14 The great majority of the death row outcomes
we study occurred after 1990 when the percentage of
Hispanics in the states is calculated with yearly data.
ure of outsider presence explains whether a
state has a legal death penalty, outsiders are
measured with a dummy coded 1 if over 75
percent of a state’s population was born in-state
(BORNINST). We assess partisanship with the
percentage of a state’s vote for the Republican
candidate in the last presidential election
(PPRSVOTE). The threat from higher murder
rates is gauged by murder rates provided by the
Uniform Crime Reports.
Berry and colleagues (1998) view mass ide-
ologies (IDEOLOGY) as the mean on a liber-
al-conservative continuum. They identify the
ideological position of each member of
Congress using interest-group ratings
(Americans for Democratic Action, Committee
on Political Education) of a representative’s vot-
ing record and then estimate mass ideology in
each congressional district with this score for the
district’s incumbent and with an estimated score
for the incumbent’s challenger in the last elec-
tion. Incumbent ideology scores are combined
with estimated challenger ideology scores
weighted by district election results to capture
district ideologies. Berry and colleagues cal-
culate state-level scores on liberalism-conser-
vatism with the mean of these within-state
congressional district scores. We analyze the
most recent version of this index, which gauges
congressional votes until 2003 and adds a few
corrections to the values first published in 1998.
The most liberal states receive the highest
scores, so the coefficients on this variable should
be negative.15
We measure the tax base and a state’s abili-
ty to support this costly punishment with real
median household income (RLMEDINC). We
capture joblessness with the percentage of
unemployed (%UNEMP). Because this factor
may have a nonlinear relationship, we include
its square. We also include a dummy variable
coded 1 (YEAR92PLUS) for years after 1992
when execution frequencies increased and a
dummy variable coded 1 for southern states
(STH). We use one-tailed tests because theo-
retically based predictions about sign have been
stipulated.16
ANALYSES
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND
MULTIVARIATE MODELS OF EXECUTION
PROBABILITIES
INITIAL ANALYSES. Figure 1 shows the distribu-
tion of death row outcomes during the years in
question and Table 2 shows the predicted signs,
means, and standard deviations. In Table 3 we
begin the multivariate analyses by restricting the
first model to individual explanatory factors to
show contrasts with subsequent models that
include contextual effects. Recall that two
dummy variables are set equal to 1 if offenders
are African American or Hispanic. A third is set
equal to 1 if the victim is white, and this victim
variable is interacted with the two minority
offender variables to create two interaction
terms. The coefficients on these two product
terms capture what happens to either African
American or Hispanic offenders who killed
whites (all necessary main effects are included).
A sixth dummy variable is set equal to 1 if a con-
demned offender is male, while the last is equal
to 1 if an offender has prior convictions. In
Model 2 we begin to add contextual variables
by entering the percentage of African American
and Hispanic residents in quadratic form. To
assess division of labor effects, population is
included as well. We add the percentage born in-
15 This index has face validity. From 1972 to 2002
Rhode Island and Massachusetts tied for second as
the most liberal states. But the sole Vermont repre-
sentative—who probably was the only member of
Congress who claimed to be a socialist in this peri-
od—earned the highest liberalism score. Mississippi
in 1972 had the most conservative score followed by
Virginia in 1974. Specialists have accepted the use
of roll-call, vote-based indexes to identify ideology
(Fowler 1982; Poole and Rosenthal 2000). Rankings
by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the
AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education
(COPE) are the most widely used and have withstood
considerable scrutiny (Herrera, Epperlein, and Smith
1995; Shaffer 1989).
16 Despite repeated attempts we have not located
information on the partisanship of state appellate
court justices. In almost all states, one appellate court
handles each level of state death row appeals, so
variation in offender outcomes probably cannot be
attributed to within state appellate court differences.
Data on factors such as offender demeanor, their
behavior in prison, offense characteristics other than
those measured, and additional information on
offender appeals unfortunately are not available.
Figure 1. Three Death Row Outcomes in 16 States by Years After Death Sentence
Table 2. Predicted Signs, Means, and Standard Deviations
Variable Predicted Sign Mean SD
1 if Executed .010 .099
1 if Black Offender + .390 .488
1 if Hispanic Offender + .068 .251
1 if White Victim + .710 .454
1 if Black  1 if White Victim + .161 .367
1 if Hispanic  1 if White Victim + .036 .187
1 if Male + .986 .116
1 if Prior Conviction + .650 .477
Percent Black + 12.772 5.331
Percent Black2 – 191.548 171.170
Percent Hispanic 0 15.212 11.189
Percent Hispanic3/10,000 + .943 1.169
Population/1,000,000 – 13.751 8.021
1 if Percent Born in State > 75 Percent – .225 .417
Murder Rate per 100,000 + 9.332 2.906
Citizen Ideology – 43.608 9.149
Percent Republican Vote for President + 48.695 9.330
Real Median Household Income/100 + 366.480 47.638
Percent Unemployed + 6.051 1.532
1 if Southern State + .528 .499
Note: Weighted by 16,361 offender-years from 16 sampled states.
state and a quadratic test of the effects of unem-
ployment in Model 3.
The results in Model 1 show that several indi-
vidual offender attributes contribute to execu-
tion probabilities. The coefficient on the first
main effect shows that African American offend-
ers whose victims are not white are less likely
to be executed. But the coefficients on the two
interaction terms suggest that African Americans
or Hispanics found guilty of killing members of
the majority race face a greater likelihood of this
punishment (we defer discussing significance
tests on contrasts between the coefficients on
individual variables until discussion of the best
model). If they persist, these last findings are
particularly important as they suggest that the
extra-legal attribute with the most powerful
effects on death sentences accounts for post-
death sentence execution probabilities as well.
In Model 2 we add five contextual variables
to the individual determinants in the first model.
Although these additions increase model
explanatory power as the BIC statistic falls
sharply, the coefficients on the interaction terms
that assess execution probabilities for minorities
who kill whites remain significant. We again
find that African Americans convicted of mur-
dering nonwhites are less likely to be executed,
but execution probabilities remain higher for
African Americans who kill a white. The con-
textual results show that execution probabilities
are greater in states with more African
Americans until a threshold in this proportion
is reached (we also defer reporting this inflec-
tion point until the presentation of the best
model). Although the percentage of Hispanic
residents has no effect, this ethnic threat vari-
able in squared form enhances execution prob-
abilities. Additional findings show that states
with larger populations and a greater division of
labor are not as likely to execute. After we add
the unemployment rate and its square together
with the percentage born in-state, these initial
results suggest that unemployment rates influ-
ence execution probabilities, but this penalty is
less likely in states with few outsiders.
COMPREHENSIVE MODELS. Yet other accounts
may matter. In Model 4 of Table 4, we add state
murder rates, citizen ideology, votes for
Republican presidential candidates, real medi-
an income, and a dummy variable for years
after 1992 when the number of executions
expanded. Model 5 is identical to Model 4, but
we replace the quadratic Hispanic threat spec-
ification with the cubic power transformation.
Model 6 only differs from Model 5 because a
Table 3. Post-Capital Sentencing Determinants of Executions Estimated with Discrete-Time Logit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory Variables Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Individual Effects
—1 if Black Offender –1.015*** .349 –.761*** .220 –.758*** .215
—1 if Hispanic Offender –.375 .465 .131 .228 .102 .238
—1 if White Victim –.348 .258 –.067 .230 –.157 .219
—1 if Black Off.  1 if White Victim 1.394*** .371 .898** .322 1.042*** .337
—1 if Hispanic Off.  1 if White Victim 1.130** .422 .332 .255 .449* .257
—1 if Male .458 .499 .907* .545 .870 .539
—1 if Prior Conviction .082 .130 .134 .103 .123 .086
Contextual Effects
—Percent Black .— .— .443*** .106 .423*** .077
—Percent Black2 .— .— –.011*** .003 –.012*** .002
—Percent Hispanic .— .— –.052 .058 –.036 .054
—Percent Hispanic2 .— .— –.005*** .001 .003** .001
—Population/1,000,000 .— .— –.149*** .040 –.100*** .029
—1 if Percent Born in State > 75 Percent .— .— .— .— –1.813*** .322
—Percent Unemployed .— .— .— .— –1.144** .392
—Percent Unemployed2 .— .— .— .— .069** .027
Constant –5.101*** .633 –8.556*** 1.118 4.093*** 1.258
Log Likelihood –873.3*** –816.6*** –793.7***
BIC Statistic 1853.4 1778.8 1732.8
Notes: N = 1,560 offenders and 16,361 offender-years from 16 states; state-level cluster corrected standard
errors; coefficients on offender-year dummies not shown.
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests except for intercept).
control for state location in the South is added
to the explanatory variables entered in Model 5.
The results in Model 4 show that the addition
of political variables and the tax base measure
increase model explanatory power as the BIC
statistic again declines from its value in Model
3. The findings confirm other contextual expec-
tations: liberal states are less likely to execute,
but capital punishment likelihoods are higher in
states where Republican presidential candidates
received the most votes and where the tax base
is substantial. These findings show that the mur-
der rates have the expected positive relationship
with executions, but the unemployment rates are
no longer significant after the addition of con-
textual variables that assess state political envi-
ronments. When we replace the quadratic
Hispanic specification with the cubic power
alternative in Model 5, all results persist, but the
coefficient on Hispanic threat becomes signif-
icant.
A test of the significance of the difference
between the absolute value of the coefficient on
the black offender main effect and the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term that gauges exe-
cution likelihoods for blacks who kill whites
shows that the interaction term coefficient is
greater than its counterpart on the main effect
(two-tailed p = .038). Other tests that gauge the
statistical significance of contrasts reveal that
the coefficient on the blacks who kill whites
term is most substantial. For example, when
we replace the condemned blacks main effect
with the same variable for whites, we find iden-
tical significance test results again indicating
that the coefficient on the black killings of
whites interaction term is more substantial.
Similar tests show that the coefficient on the
Table 4. Post-Capital Sentencing Determinants of Executions Estimated with Discrete-Time Logit
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Explanatory Variables Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Individual Effects
—1 if Black Offender –.737*** .233 –.744*** .234 –.764*** .231
—1 if Hispanic Offender .108 .248 .107 .248 .099 .253
—1 if White Victim –.141 .202 –.144 .202 –.158 .200
—1 if Black Off.  1 if White Victim 1.007** .339 1.011** .342 1.033*** .334
—1 if Hispanic Off.  1 if White Victim .429* .256 .437* .263 .454* .269
—1 if Male .845 .527 .852 .531 .848 .530
—1 if Prior Conviction .118* .069 .119* .073 .121 .075
Contextual Effects
—Percent Black .450*** .066 .439*** .065 .479*** .113
—Percent Black2 –.014*** .002 –.014*** .002 –.014*** .003
—Percent Hispanic –.019 .068 .— .— .— .—
—Percent Hispanic2 .002 .002 .— .— .— .—
—Percent Hispanic3/10,000 .— .— .533*** .109 .569*** .134
—Population/1,000,000 –.099*** .025 –.099*** .027 –.099*** .026
—1 if Percent Born in State > 75 Percent –2.000*** .265 –1.998*** .284 –2.089*** .397
—Murder Rate .088* .045 .102** .043 .102* .045
—Citizen Ideology –.030** .011 –.029** .011 –.033*** .009
—Percent Republican Vote for President .048*** .011 .048*** .012 .052*** .010
—Real Median Household Income /100 .010*** .003 .010*** .003 .009** .003
—Percent Unemployed –.749 .463 –.778 .493 –.783 .500
—Percent Unemployed2 .050 .033 .052 .035 .052 .036
—1 if after 1992 1.597*** .307 1.602*** .316 1.635*** .302
—1 if Southern State .— .— .— .— –.291 .611
Constant –12.123*** 2.268 –12.016*** 1.951 –12.004*** 1.966
Log Likelihood –776.1*** –775.6*** –775.5***
BIC Statistic 1697.7 1696.8 1696.5
Notes: N = 1,560 offenders and 16,361 offender-years from 16 states; state-level cluster corrected standard
errors; coefficients on offender-year dummies not shown.
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests except for intercept).
black killings of whites interaction term is
greater than the coefficient on the Hispanic-
white victim interaction term (two-tailed p =
.023). Finally, when we add the South in the last
model, we find no noteworthy changes in the
results.
We now can calculate the inflection point
where the relationship between the percentage
of African Americans and execution probabili-
ties shifts from positive to negative. Again using
coefficients from the best model (Model 5), we
find that this change occurs after the percent-
age of African American residents reaches 16.2
or about the 86th percentile in the percentage of
African American residents in these 16 states in
this period. This result suggests that execution
probabilities start to fall only after the potential
African American vote reaches a rather sub-
stantial threshold. And odds ratios suggest that
these effects are not weak. The exponentiated
coefficient from Model 5 that gauges execution
probabilities for African Americans convicted
of killing a white is 2.75. The odds ratio for
African Americans who kill nonwhites is .476.
The odds ratio for Hispanics convicted of killing
a white is 1.55. The size of some contextual
effects are substantial as well: for example, the
odds ratio for the percentage of blacks in these
states is 1.55 and its counterpart on the cube of
Hispanic presence is 1.70.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. Some death
row inmates accept their sentences and try to
stop all appeals. These “volunteers” are dis-
proportionately white (Lofquist 2002). In states
that rarely execute, a greater proportion of the
few executed offenders are volunteers (Lofquist
2002), so a failure to control for this effect may
bias the estimates. The data at hand do not let
us identify such offenders, but we can discov-
er if this effect matters because volunteers are
executed with less delay. If those executed early
differ sharply from those executed later, analy-
ses limited to inmates executed later—or mod-
els restricted to offenders executed from 5 to 10
years after sentencing—should produce findings
that differ, but they do not. The same variables
are significant in each of these five restricted
analyses (not shown but available on request).
Such theoretically identical findings suggest
that our inability to directly control for volun-
teers has not distorted the findings.
We find no evidence for additional interac-
tion effects and these negative results persist
when we assess cross-level interactions between
individual and jurisdictional characteristics.
This result is important for methodological rea-
sons. Cross-level interaction significance tests
are too optimistic if such tests are not estimat-
ed with an Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM)
approach. Yet none of these interactions are sig-
nificant when they are assessed with the non-
HLM method we employ. Such cross-level
effects therefore will not be uncovered if they
are estimated with HLM because this estimator
will produce larger estimates of the standard
errors. The cluster adjustment we use to correct
the standard errors for within state interdepen-
dencies therefore should suffice, as HLM will
produce the same nonsignificant and redun-
dant findings about cross-level interactions.17
We entered religious fundamentalism along
with various measures of Republican gover-
nors and this party’s strength in state legislatures,
but these determinants had no effects (models
not shown). We find no evidence that federal
judge partisanship influences executions.18 To
isolate the effects of otherwise omitted cross-
state national political, social, or macroeco-
nomic changes, we included dummies coded for
17 For readers who prefer two-tailed significance
tests even if theoretical justification for direction is
provided, we list coefficients that reached the one- but
not the two-tailed .05 level: in Table 3, the male
offender variable in Model 2 is significant at the .05
one- but not the two-tailed threshold and the same is
true for the Hispanics who killed whites interaction
term in Model 3. In Table 4, each of the coefficients
on the Hispanics convicted of killing a white inter-
action term are significant at the one- but not the two-
tailed level and the same generality holds for the
coeff icient on the prior conviction variable in
Model 4.
18 We gauged the degree to which the estimates are
robust by dropping each of the 16 sampled states in
analyses not shown. The implications persist but this
dependent variable already was skewed. To avoid a
logit model that could not be estimated after we
removed a state with many executions and increased
dependent variable skewness, we had to remove a few
explanatory variables from some of these 16 equa-
tions. Only one of the 16 sampled death penalty
states (Kansas, which had a tiny death row popula-
tion) had no executions. The elimination of states with
few executions had only tiny effects on the estimates.
each year (models not shown). All explanatory
variables that matter in Table 4 were significant
in these models. Such results suggest that shifts
in the national political or macroeconomic cli-
mate cannot account for these results. The mod-
els in Table 4 pass the link test for
misspecification. These considerations provide
added reasons to think that the most compre-
hensive models capture the primary determi-
nants of death row outcomes.19
We nevertheless must acknowledge that we
were forced to use advanced statistical tech-
niques to overcome data limitations. Although
there are good reasons to believe that the report-
ed estimates are unbiased and consistent, supe-
rior data always are preferable to such statistical
alternatives (for a forceful illustration, see
Donohue and Wolfors 2005). In particular, we
hope that subsequent researchers can obtain
more exhaustive information on victim race
and other considerations from additional death
penalty states. Perhaps researchers with the
resources and the time to achieve a better rap-
port with state correction agency officials who
would not cooperate with our requests for data
can produce superior findings about this issue
by analyzing additional states.
DISCUSSION
THE FINDINGS
Possibly because offender prior convictions
contribute to prosecutors’ decisions to seek the
death sentence and lead trial courts to support
this request, we find weak and inconsistent evi-
dence that this factor affects post-death sen-
tence execution probabilities. The findings show
that gender is nonsignificant, but the proportion
of condemned women in our sample is tiny. Yet
victim race clearly is the most important indi-
vidual finding. The coefficients and the signif-
icance tests that gauge contrasts in the size of
these point estimates show that blacks convict-
ed of killing whites are more likely to be exe-
cuted than other death row offenders. Such
results do not contradict hypotheses that local
prosecutors with an interest in protecting well-
publicized legal victories that should further
their political careers make successful efforts to
resist death row appeals. These findings also
support a hypothesis that state justices do not
ignore pressures to deny appellate relief to
minority death row offenders who kill whites.
But the findings suggest that African Americans
on death row for killing nonwhites are less like-
ly to be executed than other condemned pris-
oners.
The evidence corroborates hypotheses that
Hispanics also face higher execution probabil-
ities if their victims are white. Yet the odds
ratios that gauge the strength of this Hispanic
effect and the untransformed coefficients are
significantly weaker than their counterparts that
assess the strength of the black offender, white
victim effect. Such contrasting results about
the explanatory power of ethnic rather than
racial effects should not be surprising in light
of the fiercely divisive and violent conflicts
about race throughout U.S. history (Myrdal
1944; Tocqueville 1948). Only a few states had
substantial Hispanic populations before the
1990s. This ethnic group may have been too
small in most death penalty states to be suffi-
ciently threatening. Subsequent studies, how-
ever, may provide greater support for this ethnic
threat account because the Hispanic population
recently has expanded so rapidly.
The contextual results always show that
minority proportions matter. Larger percent-
ages of African American residents produce
higher execution probabilities, but this effect
becomes negative only after the proportion of
African Americans reaches a relatively sub-
stantial threshold. The positive sign on the
unsquared coefficient provides evidence for a
racial threat account, but the negative sign on
the squared percentage of African American
residents suggests that execution probabilities
respond to election pressures. The form of the
nonlinear relationship between Hispanic pro-
portions in a state and execution probabilities
19 Attempts to use other diagnostic tests failed
because these estimates are weighted. Tests con-
ducted without the weights suggest that estimation
problems are not present. No observation has a high
leverage score, and there are only a few modest out-
liers. Estimate stability and a VIF analysis conduct-
ed on the state variables (without the squared terms)
yields a maximum score 4.33. Both considerations
suggest that collinearity is not present. Although we
analyze 16 states, there are 480 state-years as all but
two of our state-level variables are time-varying by
year. Fewer case-years are common in pooled time-
series analysis.
differs from the nonlinear association between
African American presence and these proba-
bilities. Probably because the proportion of
Hispanics in all but a few states was so modest,
the findings indicate that a growth in the per-
centage of Hispanics yields increasingly
stronger execution probabilities without a rever-
sal in the sign of this relationship.
Consistent with prior findings on the factors
that produce a legal death penalty in the states
(Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), the findings in
this article suggest that jurisdictions with the
most residents born in-state are less likely to use
this ultimate punishment. This association prob-
ably is based on latent hostility to strangers
(Hale 1996) and to a corresponding reluctance
to invoke the ultimate penalty against people
who are regarded as one’s neighbors. A differ-
ent aggregate finding supports another threat
account, as the results show that execution prob-
abilities are greater in states that have the high-
est murder rates.
Votes for Republican presidential candidates,
who often run on law and order platforms, help
explain execution likelihoods as well. Beckett’s
(1997) findings suggest that law and order cam-
paign rhetoric magnifies the public salience of
the crime issue. Successful law and order polit-
ical campaigns therefore should produce greater
support for the harshest punishment. The sen-
sitizing effects of this rhetoric and the relative
success of Republican law and order candidates
in some jurisdictions—which almost certainly
indicates considerable preexisting support for
capital punishment—help explain why votes
for Republican candidates provide such a robust
explanation for executions. It is interesting that
the presence of a Republican governor does not
increase execution probabilities (results not
shown), but this finding should not be surpris-
ing as this factor does not explain the legaliza-
tion of capital punishment (Jacobs and
Carmichael 2002). Governors must decide the
final appeal before an execution. This awesome
moral responsibility gives these political offi-
cials good reason to be ambivalent about this
punishment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002;
Zimring and Hawkins 1986).
As theorists such as Garland (1990, 2001) and
Savelsberg (1994) would expect, the explanatory
power of political ideology suggests that polit-
ical values contribute to the propensity to exe-
cute. When or where there is greater political
support for liberal values, execution probabili-
ties diminish. This result supports claims
(Lakoff 1996) that support for the death penal-
ty is one of the most important differences
between liberals and conservatives. Finally, the
results suggest that the affluent states that can
better afford this costly punishment use it more
often.
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
This analysis fills critical gaps in the sparse lit-
erature on the application of capital punish-
ment. First, we gauged the effects of
offender-victim racial contrasts and found that
victim race is a strong determinant of execu-
tions. Until this study, and despite the empiri-
cal strength of victim race in trial-court studies
about the death sentence process, apparently
no research has gauged the explanatory power
of this factor. In addition to the findings about
theoretically important individual and legal fac-
tors, our data set lets us test environmental
determinants that have been ignored in the lit-
erature. The findings suggest that these con-
textual omissions are unfortunate, as
environmental accounts have substantial
explanatory power in this and in other analyses
that seek to explain criminal justice outcomes.
Compared to the studies of the determinants of
death sentences that are restricted to individual
data from one or a few jurisdictions, this study’s
coverage is far greater as we assessed the effects
of both individual and contextual accounts over
a 30-year period in a diverse set of multiple
states.
Reviews of the related research on race and
felony sentencing (Chiricos and Crawford 1995;
Walker et al. 1996) suggest that substantial dis-
agreement exists in this literature. These reviews
both base their conclusions on results that appear
in only a bare majority of the many available
investigations. Almost all of the many studies
that analyze trial court sentencing are based on
offender samples from just one or only a few
trial courts in a specific region. Yet since trial
courts exist in diverse environments, inconsis-
tent results can be expected. If each court study
investigates death penalty sentences in just one
or a few localities, and their political climates
differ, it will be difficult to uncover general
relationships, particularly because court envi-
ronments have so much explanatory power
(Helms and Jacobs 2002). The same reasoning
holds for death penalty investigations. It follows
that a study of executions in many states that
assesses both contextual and individual factors
should provide more accurate results than would
analyses restricted to individual explanations
in just one or only a few jurisdictions.
Another plausible explanation for these dis-
agreements concerns the neglect of political
effects in almost all of the studies of criminal
justice system outcomes. As one might expect
in light of the recent theoretical emphasis on the
political nature of legal punishments (Chambliss
1994; Foucault 1977; Garland 1990, 2001) and
the Republican party’s tactical use of law and
order appeals to covertly enhance voters’ racial
fears (see the quotes in note 4), these results
show that executions increased after states
awarded additional votes to Republican candi-
dates. Yet increased electoral support for law and
order Republicans who enthusiastically embrace
the death penalty may be based on preexisting
conservative values. But this alternative hypoth-
esis is unlikely as votes for Republican presi-
dential candidates account for executions after
citizen ideology has been held constant. Such
findings, of course, show that these supposed-
ly objective and purely legal decisions about
who will die are shaped by factors that should
not be relevant.
These findings also confirm the racial poli-
tics perspective that provided the primary con-
ceptual impetus for this research. In the
homogeneous European democracies, predom-
inant penal emphasis is on the reintegration of
offenders into a solidaristic society adminis-
tered by experts who are only distantly account-
able to the voters (Savelsberg 1994; Whitman
2003). In the United States, however, the pub-
lic’s Manichean image of human nature, com-
bined with a history of bitter racial conflict,
has produced an exclusionary penal system.
According to Wacquant (2000, 2001), the
resilient divisions produced by slavery and by
the later virulent measures used to maintain
white supremacy created a segregative penal
solution consistent with the dominant public
image of criminals as members of a vile racial
underclass. This racial history and the resulting
cultural premises helped to produce a criminal
justice system that primarily uses incapacitation
to control street crime. The most reliable way to
incapacitate incorrigible offenders is to kill
them. This incapacitative solution fits with the
prevailing public view—often forcefully
expressed politically in this most direct of all
large democracies—that the primary goal of
the U.S. criminal justice system should be
vengeance.
Executions therefore should be most likely in
jurisdictions in which covertly racist law and
order political appeals have been most suc-
cessful and where the presence of a large African
American population—that has not become
quite large enough to enforce its political val-
ues—threatens dominant whites. Prior research
supports such political and racial results.
Findings show that the same aggregate politi-
cal and racial factors account for the likelihood
that a state will legalize the death penalty
(Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). In another study,
Jacobs and colleagues (2005) report that simi-
lar political and racial factors explain the num-
ber of death sentences. But compared to these
two studies and other aggregate-level research,
this investigation is unique as it analyzes both
state and individual characteristics. Probably
the most important finding that emerges from
this multilevel approach concerns victim race.
African Americans who breach the racial caste
system by killing whites can more often expect
the harshest of all penalties, and this finding
holds after many contextual level political and
racial effects have been held constant. Such
results do not contradict Wacquant’s (2000,
2001) theoretical claims that a primary goal in
the current U.S. criminal justice system is to sus-
tain the prior racial caste system even though the
current methods are less transparent than the
lawless brutality used in the past.20
The most important legal implication con-
cerns racial equity. Many claims have been
made that the U.S. criminal justice system is not
colorblind, yet after multiple studies, definitive
evidence showing that the trial courts sentence
African Americans less leniently than whites has
remained elusive. This study instead analyzed
racial effects on the post-sentencing execution
process. The findings show that despite efforts
20 For additional findings on how past racial, eth-
nic, or religiously based brutality continues to affect
current practices, see Archer and Gartner (1984),
Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen (2005), Savelsberg
and King (2005), and Jacobs and colleagues (2005).
to transcend an unfortunate racial past, residues
of this fierce discrimination evidently still linger,
at least when the most morally critical decision
about punishment is decided. Findings indicat-
ing that African Americans who kill nonwhites
are less likely to be executed than their coun-
terparts who kill whites show that the post-sen-
tencing capital punishment process continues to
place greater value on white lives. Evidently,
inclinations to devalue African Americans in
constitutional compromises in the distant past
remain today, although they are expressed in less
conspicuous ways. Associate Justice William
Brennan helps us understand the importance
of such discriminatory findings:
Those whom we would banish from society or
from the human community itself often speak in
too faint a voice to be heard above society’s
demand for punishment. It is the particular role of
the courts to hear these voices, for the Constitution
declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone
dictate the conditions of social life. (Brennan 1987)
This evidence shows that the state and federal
appellate courts—who should pay special atten-
tion to those accused of the most horrif ic
crimes—evidently continue to listen to some
voices more than others.
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